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Abstract This article will examine how the notion of
emotional authenticity is intertwined with the notions
of naturalness and artificiality in the context of the
recent debates about ‘neuro-enhancement’ and
‘neuro-psychopharmacology.’ In the philosophy of
mind, the concept of authenticity plays a key role in
the discussion of the emotions. There is a widely held
intuition that an artificial means will always lead to an
inauthentic result. This article, however, proposes that
artificial substances do not necessarily result in
inauthentic emotions. The literature provided by the
philosophy of mind on this subject usually resorts to
thought experiments. On the other hand, the recent
literature in applied ethics on ‘enhancement’ provides
good reasons to include real world examples. Such
case studies reveal that some psychotropic drugs such
as antidepressants actually cause people to undergo
experiences of authenticity, making them feel ‘like
themselves’ for the first time in their lives. Beginning
with these accounts, this article suggests three non-
naturalist standards for emotions: the authenticity
standard, the rationality standard, and the coherence
standard. It argues that the authenticity standard is not
always the only valid one, but that the other two ways
of assessing emotions are also valid, and that they can
even have repercussions on the felt authenticity of
emotions. In conclusion, it sketches some of the
normative implications if not ethical intricacies that
accompany the enhancement of emotions.
Keywords Neuro-enhancement . Authenticity .
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Introduction: The Enhancement of Emotions
and its Role in Emotional Authenticity
According to Charles Taylor, American society is
committed to an ideal of authenticity, or even to an
‘ethics of authenticity,’ that has its roots in Puritan-
ism.1 This ethics of authenticity demands that each
person should strive for self-perfection, should make
the best out of life, and should actualize hidden
potential. In a capitalist or neo-liberalist society, those
who fail to meet this standard of ongoing self-
actualization and self-optimization are regarded as
losers who lead unhappy and unfulfilled lives [2–4].
Perceived in this manner, ‘authenticity’ has be-
come a key notion in recent literature on ‘enhance-
ment’ in applied ethics; people long for personal
authenticity and therefore use enhancement techni-
ques [40]. According to Eric Juengst [5]: 29 f., the
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term ‘enhancement’ is used to ‘characterize interven-
tions designed to improve human form or functioning
beyond what is necessary to sustain or restore good
health.’ Enhancement usually does not ‘respond to
medical needs,’ but aims to make a healthy person
feel better. It is thus opposed to treatment or therapy.
In order to find their ‘true selves,’ people wish to
improve their outer appearance via cosmetic surgery
and their physical and cognitive performance via
doping and smart drugs. Most importantly, they also
enhance their subjective emotional well-being
through lifestyle drugs [2, 6]. In this vein, the
enhancement of affective states is a way of changing
a person’s ‘natural’ emotional life by intervening with
artificial means. Emotions are mostly enhanced
pharmacologically, that is, through psychotropic
lifestyle drugs designed in line with recent insights
of brain research (see, e.g., [2, 6–8]). In addition,
there are new treatments for the sick that influence
emotions through ‘deep brain stimulation’ (DBS) via
brain pacemakers for Parkinson’s patients, and trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), which is used to
treat depression. It is unclear whether healthy people
will ever use these technologies as enhancement
devices in the future. Already nowadays, however,
even healthy people who do not suffer from depres-
sion in the medical sense use psychopharmacological
drugs to feel better and to enhance their social
performance.
Among the neuro-enhancement strategies already
on the market, this paper will therefore focus on
psychopharmacological enhancement, and especial-
ly on the antidepressant Fluoxetine, which is a
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor commonly
known as Prozac. Prozac is an especially wide-
spread drug, and there has already been consider-
able research done on the philosophical questions
and social effects, including work by psychiatrist
Peter Kramer [9] and ethicist Carl Elliott [2]. The
specific contribution to the debate that this paper
attempts to provide consists in the answer to the
following research question: ‘Can emotional authen-
ticity or inauthenticity be inferred from the natural-
ness or artificiality of the devices employed, here
from the intake of Prozac as an enhancement drug?’
In other words: Does the consumption of Prozac and
similar new psychopharmacological drugs necessar-
ily lead to inauthentic emotions, or could it even lead
to emotional authenticity?
As Peter Kramer points out, Prozac is not simply a
mood-brightener. Rather, it is a highly efficient drug that
transforms a person’s character and emotional disposi-
tion as a whole ([9]: 10 f.). According to Kramer’s and
Elliott’s research, Prozac can even be regarded as an
authenticity-generating drug. This assumption requires
further investigation. The main effect of Prozac is to
relieve a person from social anxieties. While using
Prozac, some shy people may become talkative and
easygoing. After only some weeks on the medication,
some individuals with a traumatic history find a way of
dealing with the past and creating a positive attitude
toward the future. They become active and self-
confident. A paradigmatic case is Peter Kramer’s
patient Tess ([9]: 1–21; 278).
Tess was ‘the eldest of ten children born to a passive
mother and an alcoholic father in the poorest housing-
project in our city,’ as Kramer writes. She had suffered
‘neglect and abuse’ during her childhood ([9]: 1; 3).
When she was twelve, her father died and her mother
fell into a permanent clinical depression. At that point,
Tess ‘took over the family‘ and managed to ‘steer all
nine siblings into stable jobs and marriages,’ and even
made a ‘business career’ herself ([9]: 1 f.).
Despite her success in all these respects, when Tess
appears at Kramer’s practice, she leads an unhappy
personal life. She stumbles from one abusive partnership
into the next ([9]: 2) and becomes more and more
depressed. At some point, she shows all the symptoms of
depression: ‘Tears and sadness, absence of hope,
inability to experience pleasure, sense of worthlessness,
loss of sleep and appetite, guilty ruminations, poor
memory and concentration’ ([9]: 3). Kramer is especially
specific about her ‘low self-worth’ and her ‘social
unhappiness’ when it comes to personal relations ([9]: 4).
The first step Kramer takes is to put her on
imipramine, an old antidepressant that made her feel
drowsy. Despite these side-effects, the medication
works well and saves her from falling into a
permanent depression. This is why Kramer even
describes her as healed, because she ‘no longer met
a doctor’s criteria of depression’ ([9]: 4). At this point,
one could say, the part of Kramer’s story that deals
with Tess’ therapy ends and a new part of the story
starts, dealing with her psychotherapeutic enhance-
ment, although Kramer still tries to make sure that a
potentially masked depression does not return ([9]: 6).
In a second step, Kramer prescribes Prozac,
enabling her to take a higher dose of medication to
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prevent her from falling back into depression. As he
states: ‘My goal was not to transform Tess, but to
restore her’ ([9]: 7). However, what happens can only
be described as a transformation of her personality:
I have never seen a person’s social life reshaped
so rapidly and dramatically. Low self-worth,
competitiveness, jealousy, poor interpersonal
skills, shyness, fear of intimacy—the usual
causes of social awkwardness—are so deeply
ingrained and so difficult to influence that
ordinarily change comes gradually if at all. But
Tess blossomed all at once. (p. 8)
After having taken Prozac, Tess’ love relationships
become satisfactory, and she remarks positive changes
in her work-life as well. She becomes ‘less conciliatory,
firmer, unafraid of confrontation’ ([9]: 8 f.). Even more
importantly, she breaks free from her overly-tight
family relations. The ‘relation towards those she
watched over changed,’ as Kramer puts it. She did
not ‘feel heightened responsibility for the injured’
anymore and ‘moved to another nearby town, the
farthest she had ever lived from her mother’ ([9]: 9).
Like numerous other patients, Tess experiences her
‘loss of seriousness,’ as she puts it, as a ‘relief’ ([9]:
9). Her recovery continues, and finally Kramer takes
her off the drug. However, after a few weeks off
medication, Tess asks him to prescribe her the drug
again, explaining that she is not herself anymore
without it. She perceives her ‘old self’ under which
the symptoms of social awkwardness and depression
prevail as ‘ill,’ and not as her true self.
Tess had become to understand herself—the
person that she had been for so many years—to
be mildly ill. [...] She did not feel herself when
the medicine wore off and she was rechallenged
by an external stress. [...] On imipramine, no
longer depressed but still inhibited and subdued,
Tess felt ‘myself again’. But while on Prozac,
she underwent a redefinition of the self. Off
Prozac, when she became again inhibited and
subdued [...], she now felt ‘not myself’. Prozac
redefined Tess’ understanding of what was
essential to her and what was intrusive and
pathological (p. 19).
At this point, it is time to sum up the theoretical
results. On Prozac, Tess says that she feels authentic; she
feels like herself for the first time in her life. Without
medication, Tess falls back into a state that she describes as
not being herself. These consequences of the intake of
Prozac seem to be the same for numerous other patients as
well ([9]: 21). Accordingly, ‘authenticity’ means being
able to focus on the essential things in life and on self-
realization. No longer hampered by social anxieties,
patients such as Tess build up promising relationships
with others and find meaning in life. Authenticity, in this
sense, has an existentialist dimension: Prozac allegedly
provides some insights into the meaning of life for those
who take it. It helps them experience what they regard as
their true selves. However, it is worth noting that Kramer
describes the process as one of a ‘redefinition’ of the self
([9]: 19). This means that the socially competent and
cheerful self that is prevalent under Prozac is declared as
the ‘real self,’ whereas the less welcome, shy and
depressed one, is not experienced as real anymore. One
could say here that what is experienced is not a simple
revelation, but a transformation into a better or even
‘ideal’ self, which is accordingly interpreted as the true
one. In this sense, Prozac maybe called an authenticity-
generating drug. It can ‘shape our understanding of the
authentic self’ as Kramer puts it ([9]: 20) and, equally
importantly, it makes the perception of the authentic,
ideal self perceivable as a phenomenally felt quality. This
capacity to bring about felt authenticity may explain why
Prozac is so popular and in such high demand.
Under Elliott and Kramer’s application, the concept
of ‘authenticity’ seems to be a vague umbrella term,
embracing personal identity over time, autonomy,
originality, self-knowledge, as well as self-realization,
and even self-transformation toward the ideal self.2 Carl
Elliott points out a puzzle of authenticity: How can a
person be provided with a more authentic self by
means of artificial enhancement devices? One hesitates
to count those features and emotions that emerge
suddenly within 2 weeks just by ingesting a pill as
authentic. The idea that artificial devices can reveal a
person’s authentic selfhood seems repugnant.
These and similar concerns have been expressed
recently by David Pugmire [10]: 111. Pugmire is one
of the authors who caused emotional authenticity to
become a key notion in emotion theory in the
philosophy of mind and moral psychology, revealing
a debate on emotional truth, emotional integrity, and
emotional authenticity (see, e.g., De Sousa [10–17]).
2 For a classical discussion of the term ‘authenticity’ cf. Trilling
[42].
Authenticity Anyone? The Enhancement of Emotions via Neuro-Psychopharmacology 53
Pugmire emphasizes the natural or artificial origin of an
emotion. Some bio-conservative authors also take such
an approach in the current ethical debate on enhance-
ment.3 For them, an artificial means necessarily leads to
an inauthentic result. In their eyes, those who take
psychotropic drugs and employ other technical devices
necessarily end up in an inauthentic emotional state.
These feelings of repugnance toward technical interven-
tions raise the concern about the proper reference system.
What is the natural state with which an artificial means
interferes? To find an answer to this and to similar
questions, the time has come to examine the assumed
naturalness and artificiality of emotional states.
Natural and Artificial Emotions
The main question in this paper is: Do artificial
means like the antidepressant Prozac necessarily lead
to inauthentic emotions? An appropriate answer
requires further clarification of what inauthentic
emotions could be and how they are connected with
emotional artificiality. Some of the interdisciplinary
approaches to emotion theory reveal a nature-nurture
debate on emotion. Culture-relativist and sociocon-
structivist accounts are opposed to somatic and
biologist definitions of what an emotion is.4 The
latter claim that there are at least some innate
emotions. Nevertheless, it proves to be problematic
to apply the term ‘natural’ to innate emotions and the
term ‘artificial’ to those that are more culturally
shaped or more complex. It remains unclear in which
respects these ‘higher’ emotions are more ‘artificial’
than the more basic ones. It seems that the dichotomy
of ‘artificiality’ versus ‘naturalness’ does not really fit
the nature-nurture debate on emotion.
What then is an artificial emotion? There are at least
two different meanings for the adjective ‘artificial.’ In
general, one can distinguish the process by which an
object or state is produced from the character or
structure it actually has at a given point in time ([23]:
179–180, 2006: 234). One can accordingly distin-
guish between an adverbial and a predicative sense of
the word ‘artificial.’ Taken in an adverbial sense, the
word refers to the process or modus of the generation
of an entity or state (cf. [23]: 179). In a predicative
sense, in contrast, it refers to the intrinsic qualities and
the character of an entity or state.5
What then is the adverbial aspect of the term
‘artificiality’? What is an ‘artificially induced emo-
tion’? Does listening to Mahler’s music, to take an
example by Ronald De Sousa [25], lead to artificial
emotions? Similarly, does drinking a glass of wine
([26]: 311)? There are no clear demarcation lines
between natural and artificial devices or substances.
The recent psychopharmacological enhancement
inventions are based on an intimate knowledge of
brain processes. Thus, the adverbial sense of the term
‘artificiality’ and the meaning of ‘artificially induced
emotion’ are becoming more and more doubtful.
One can, of course, raise the objection that one
could come up with several distinctions between, for
example, changing one’s state of mind via listening to
Mahler’s music and ingesting a pill, the former being
a more active process and the latter a more passive
one. However, as soon as one asks what follows from
such a distinction between natural and artificial
means, it is to be assumed that the distinction does
not necessarily correspond to a moral distinction.
Turning to the predicative aspect of artificiality,
does the demarcation line prove clearer? Is there
something like the perceptible artificial quality of an
emotion? For authors such as Achim Stephan [26],
the answer is yes. In a thought experiment, Stephan
pictures a way to refer to what could be called the
qualitative artificiality of an emotion: A chemical
laboratory creates substances that trigger entirely
novel emotional experiences, that is, emotions no
one has ever felt before. These new emotions,
Stephan [26]: 311 claims, could rightly be called
3 The most well-known proponents of a bio- or value-
conservative position in the enhancement debate are perhaps
Habermas [18], Fukuyama [19], and the authors of the
President’s Council on Bioethics, especially Kass et al. [20].
The label ‘bio-conservative’ is used here to describe a position
that opposes technological optimism and transhumanist ideas
with regard to the enhancement of human nature. Parens’ [21]
position is a more well-balanced point of view. In what follows,
I will simplify the conservative perspective and focus on Kass
et al., who lay an emphasis on the use of psychopharmacology.
4 For an overview of the nature-nurture debate of emotion, see
Prinz [22], 103–160 and cf. Harré [39] and Roettger-Rössler [41].
5 Hence, the intrinsic character of an artificial flavour can be
called nature-identical. Correspondingly, there may be artifi-
cially produced emotions that are nature-identical in the way
the subject experiences them. Similarly, the hormone oxytocin
can be produced artificially, exposing a nature-identical
structure and experience ([24], 673–676).
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artificial ones. What he means by this is that these
emotions are artificial in a predicative sense.
There are good reasons, however, to argue that
artificiality is not a felt quality of an emotion. It seems
impossible for an emotion to have an artificial character
once it is perceived. It is important to note that the
feelings people on Prozac undergo are not experienced
as artificial.6 They are artificial in the adverbial sense,
but not artificial in the predicative sense. From the
first-person perspective, the artificially induced emo-
tions under Prozac cannot be distinguished from
natural emotions. Patients on Prozac say they do not
feel drugged at all, but feel perfectly sober and
clearheaded, whereas earlier antidepressants such as
tricyclics or MAOIs usually made them feel drugged
([9]: 66).
However, the claim that emotions cannot have an
artificially felt character is not limited to the effects of
Prozac. Rather, I support the more general, conceptual
thesis that people do not experience artificial emo-
tions when taking drugs of whatever kind. It is
certainly not possible to feel the origin of an emotion
once it is perceived. Either a person has a certain
feeling, or he or she does not have it. Once it is there,
the person can no longer distinguish how it is brought
about. Say someone has given Peter a drug that is
supposed to make him feel proud, and say that the
feelings produced by it differ qualitatively from his
normal feelings of pride. In this case, what Peter feels
after the intake of the drug is not artificial pride, but
no pride at all. It must be something else, and the
utmost he can say is that what he feels might resemble
feelings of pride. Vice versa, if the drug successfully
brings about the feeling of pride in him, he does feel
proud, and nothing else.
Still, there seems to be one special thing about
Prozac in this context: People who took earlier
antidepressants usually felt drugged, whereas this is
not the case for Prozac. Therefore it can be assumed
that people under earlier antidepressants had good
reasons to cognitively doubt the feelings they expe-
rienced under the drug because they felt as if they
were no longer in a normal state of mind and body at
all. Accordingly, they perhaps were inclined to reflect
on the history of their feelings under the drug and to
begin to experience them as inauthentic.7 On the
contrary, what Prozac seems to bring about is a
feeling of authenticity, i.e. a feeling that the emotions
a person has while taking it are his or her ideal
feelings he or she identifies with. There are no good
reasons for this person to cognitively doubt the
authenticity of these emotions—on the contrary. He
or she embraces them as the true ones. This means the
person has no reason to reflect upon their natural or
artificial origin of her emotions under Prozac. If Peter
is taking Prozac and consequently feels proud, he
feels proud, no matter how this emotion was brought
about.
To sum up, it only makes sense to use the terms
‘artificial’ and ‘natural’ in the adverbial form of
‘naturally produced’ or ‘artificially induced,’ but not
in the predicative sense of ‘perceived as natural’ or
‘perceived as artificial.’ Thus, it does not make sense
to talk about natural and artificial emotions at all as
far as their felt quality is concerned.
Because Prozac was created in the laboratory, it is,
of course, an ‘artificial’ substance, interfering with the
‘natural’ serotonin level in the brain. Does this
necessarily imply that the resulting emotions are
artificial as well? As mentioned before, the concepts
of natural and artificial emotions are problematic. It
hardly makes any sense to ask whether an artificial
means leads to an artificial emotion. Instead, a more
appropriate question might be: ‘Do artificial substan-
ces lead to inauthentic results?’ Therefore, in the
6 Cf. Kass et al. [20]: p. 250 f.: A young man who, under the
influence of Ecstasy, proposes to a young girl unknown to him,
really experiences his feelings of love in that moment without
attributing an artificial quality to it. As Kass et al. as proponents
of the bio-conservatives put it: ‘Imagine that a young party-
goer, under the influence of the drug, tells a young woman that
he loves her and wants to marry her. Imagine also that he means
it, insofar as the feeling he now has is indistinguishable from
what he might one day feel when he truly falls in love with a
woman. Should the fact that his feelings are produced by the
drug, rather than inspired by the woman, matter? It should of
course matter to her. His drug-based professions of love cannot
be taken seriously. Neither should a marriage proposal that
owes everything to his being ‘high.’ But it should also matter to
him, once he awakens from the ‘alternative reality’ induced by
taking Ecstasy and recovers the real identity that the drug
temporarily erased.’ In this vein, bio-conservative authors raise
doubts about the authenticity and normative integrity of
emotions triggered by artificial means.
7 Later on this article, I will argue that the reflection on the
rationality and coherence of his or her emotions can lead a
person to begin to doubt his or her own emotional experience
and to perceive his or her own emotions as inauthentic. I will
call this the ‘repercussions’ of the standard of rationality and
coherence on the standard of authenticity.
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following, the connections between the concept of
naturalness and the notion of authenticity will be
pointed out.
It proves helpful to consider a thought experiment
by David Pugmire dealing with some drug-induced,
‘artificial’ emotions as well. In his paper entitled
‘Real Emotion,’ David Pugmire [10]: 105 ff supports
a concept of emotional authenticity that is committed
to the ‘origin’ of an emotion. He develops a thought
experiment on a drug, Amity, which brings about
amicable feelings between human beings. The co-
workers Nick and Rick are constant quarrelers, and do
not get along with each other very well. After taking
the drug Amity, however, they immediately start to
like each other, or at least begin to tolerate each
other’s behavior.
Following David Pugmire’s argument, it is impos-
sible that an artificial means leads to authentic results.
A drug can never bring about an authentic emotion.
This at least holds for more complex feelings like
affection and love.8
In the imagined case of Nick and Rick, genuine-
ness was seen sometimes not just on content
(how one felt) but on causal history (how one
came to feel that way). There, the integrity of
some emotions was undermined if they originat-
ed in pharmacology rather than in appraisal.
(p. 111)
For David Pugmire, there is a causal relation
between the genesis and the intricate value of an
emotion. This is because for Pugmire, authentic
emotions always imply certain beliefs and cognitive
appraisals of a situation. As he puts it, ‘real emotion
demands actual belief’ ([10]: 116):9 A person is
experiencing true fear only if he or she believes that
there is a real reason to be afraid ([10]: 109).
Following this line, it is impossible for someone to
love another person wholeheartedly if he or she thinks
the other one is not a good person and worth loving.
The affection between Nick and Rick on Amity is not
an authentic emotion, according to David Pugmire.
Instead, he calls their respective emotions ‘factitious’
([10]: 111), because they are not based on actual
changes of beliefs. Therefore, for David Pugmire
[10], a technically and voluntary manipulated emotion
is not authentic:
One cannot do much to give the desired emotion
a chance, but then it just has to happen, as by
grace, or not. And there’s no cutting the risk that
it won’t by attention-management or other self-
manipulation. There are some emotions one
cannot intend to induce in oneself. Technique
cannot replace uncertainty and hope. A certain
integrity must be granted even to ‘bad’ emo-
tions. [...A] certain passivity or receptivity
towards emotion is a necessary virtue. This
prospect has always been unwelcome to those
who need to exert total control over their lives.
(pp. 119–120)
There is an implicit tension in this attitude. On the
one hand, Pugmire seems to claim that resilient and
arational emotions are necessarily inauthentic. If
individuals undergo an emotional experience that is
at odds with their rational conviction, they have an
inauthentic feeling.10 On the other hand, for Pugmire,
emotions are obviously internally arational, or at least
avolitional, because they represent the very limits of
the rational and volitional capacities. They indicate
those realms of life that evade full control.11 To a
certain degree, emotions are characterized by this
feature of rational uncontrollability. There are authen-
tic emotions that are arational or even irrational. This,
however, makes Pugmire’s approach implausible.
According to him, artificially manipulated emotions
are necessarily inauthentic because they are some-
times irrational. But as we have seen, being irrational
does not distinguish these emotions from non-
manipulated emotions that maybe arational or irratio-
nal ‘by nature.’
In light of the above-mentioned problem of
artificiality and naturalness, one could raise the
following objection to Pugmire’s account: In his
8 Pugmire [10], p. 108 distinguishes less complex emotions
(‘feelings’) from more complex emotions (‘affects’). Affection
may not be reduced to a mere feeling. Rather, it embraces
rational reasons and appraisals.
9 But see also Pugmire [10], p. 121: ‘Emotion needn’t follow
insight.’ It is not entirely clear here to which extent Pugmire
applies rationalist standards to emotions.
10 Rescher ([27], 211 ff.) even suggests ‘two modes of
happiness,’ distinguishing ‘affective happiness (pleasure)’ and
‘reflective happiness (rational contentment).’
11 Pugmire does not refer explicitly to Martha Nussbaum here,
but it seems that something comes into play that Nussbaum
[28], 43 understands as the crucial function of emotion to
indicate a person’s helplessness, vulnerability, attachment, and
mortality.
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analysis, biological causes (‘origins’) are inextricably
mixed with a person’s phenomenal consciousness
(‘felt authenticity’) on the one hand and the logical
space of reasons (‘irrationality’ of an emotion) on the
other.
Picking up the case of felt authenticity, when
addressing Stephan’s thought experiment, one could
argue that the authenticity of an emotion cannot refer
to its ‘natural’ origin. There are emotions of artificial
origin that feel ‘nature-identical’ or even authentic.
There is no necessary causal link between the
artificial origin of an emotion on the one hand and
its felt inauthentic quality on the other.
It seems that David Pugmire’s considerations fall
short of explaining why an artificial origin (e.g.,
technical means and enhancement strategies) can
engender only inauthentic emotions. Unnaturalness
of genesis is not a sufficient condition for the
inauthenticity of the felt quality of an emotion.
In most of Peter Kramer’s cases, Prozac resembles
Amity in several crucial respects. In one of his case
studies, the perfectionist working mom Julia becomes
easy to get along with under Prozac. She turns into an
understanding and loving partner to her husband and
children despite their little imperfections. After
having taken Prozac, Julia has no good reason to
doubt the integrity of her emotions. She feels relieved
because she can cope better with her everyday life,
and her family is happy about the improved situation.
Julia even feels more authentic than before; she feels
more ‘like herself’ because she now has the ‘right
feelings’ to identify with ([9]: 22–40).
Prozac does not lead to inauthentic emotions,
although these emotions are artificially induced.
There is no necessary causal connection between the
artificiality of the means and the inauthenticity of
results. Accordingly, it does not make sense to refer to
the natural or artificial origin of an emotion if one
aims to assess its authenticity.
A Non-Naturalist Approach to the Authenticity
of Emotions
Naturalness and artificiality are not perceptible states,
whereas authenticity is. Therefore, in what follows,
the term ‘authenticity’ will be reserved for the level of
qualitative perception. Here is a preliminary account.
From the first-person perspective, the authenticity of
emotions is a phenomenally felt quality. ‘Phenome-
nally felt quality’ refers to the way a person
experiences his or her own emotions. However, it
could be the case that the experience is clearer in the
negative case of inauthenticity, i.e. when a person is
of the opinion that he or she is far away from his or
her true or ideal self, having emotions he or she does
not identify with. Since it is notoriously difficult to
describe what it is like to feel authentic, it might even
be easier to fix the negative feeling of inauthenticity,
which is sometimes described as alienation and which
is a common term in the philosophical literature.
A possibly more appropriate way to argue could be
to say that the ‘feeling of authenticity’ is something
like a second order emotion, revealing whether a
certain other emotion is authentic or not. However,
this raises the concern of whether such a second order
emotion is an emotion proper, or rather an evaluative
cognitive judgment. Still, at least as far as Peter
Kramer’s patients describe it and as it is mentioned in
the reports of his patients, the experience of emotional
authenticity seems to be more a felt state than a
thought.
In this vein, however, it is to be asked why
authenticity should be a felt quality, whereas natural-
ness is not, and the same for inauthenticity and
artificiality. Again, with reference to the enhancement
literature quoted above, the emotions under Prozac
are not experienced as artificial in character; neither
are they for other drugs. In the case of Prozac, we can
explicitly state that the experiences even seem to boil
down to experiences of authenticity, while not of
artificiality ([9]: 66). As already mentioned, what
counts here is that the emotions felt under drugs in
general are not experienced as artificial. Rather, once
a person has an emotion he or she can no longer
distinguish how it came about. Otherwise, he or she
does not really have that emotion, but another one.
In what follows, I attempt to reconstruct a notion of
emotional authenticity that is in accordance with the
assessment by Peter Kramer and Carl Elliott. Following
the main thesis of the paper, emotional authenticity is to
be regarded as a phenomenally felt quality. The notion
‘emotional authenticity’ thus means the phenomenally
felt quality that a person perceives with respect to his
or her inner emotional state, no matter by which means
(natural or artificial) it has been brought about. The
main argument of this paper claims an emotion to be
authentic if the individuals experiencing it recognize
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their own feelings really as their own and identify with
them. This goes back to the above-mentioned claim
that each and every emotion is authentic if it is
recognized as such by the subject.
In everyday life, it seems that many people find it
important that their own and other people’s emotions are
authentic. This can be inferred from the widespread use
of enhancement drugs such as Prozac, because accord-
ing to Peter Kramer and Carl Elliott, especially those
people seem to use it who strive for emotional
authenticity. In this vein, the notion ‘emotional authen-
ticity’ turns into a normative term: Emotional authen-
ticity is something that people want to experience and
which they think they themselves and others should
experience. ‘Normativity’ in this context is necessarily
related to the first-person perspective of those who
experience authenticity. It does not refer to objective
values, but to what is perceived as valuable or desirable
in a normative or evaluative sense.
However, as the material gathered by Kramer and
Elliott shows, ‘emotional authenticity’ might not be the
only concept that people recur to when normatively
assessing their emotions. Emotional authenticity alone
might not be the ultimate standard of what people
demand from their emotions. Rather, in everyday life,
many people seem to find it at least equally important
that a person’s emotions are rational and coherent
rather than authentic. In what follows, these other two
standards, the one of emotional rationality and the one
of emotional coherence, will be examined.
The rationality standard of emotions is concerned
with the epistemic fittingness of intentional object and
feeling. An emotion is regarded as rational if it
represents a state of affairs correctly or at least grasps
it in a rationally comprehensible way.12 This requires a
cognitivist approach. A recent, phenomenologically
modified version of cognitivism stems from Peter
Goldie [30]. Goldie regards an emotion as a ‘feeling
toward something,’ that is, as a felt quality that is
directed intentionally toward an object or state of
affairs. The first aspect of an emotion, according to
Goldie, is a ‘feeling.’ It is the perceived aspect from
the first-person perspective. The second aspect of an
emotion is its intentional content, that is, the object or
state of affairs toward which it is directed. Emotions
differ from mere moods and bodily feelings by
pointing toward something and thus meaning some-
thing.13 It is important to note that for Goldie, the two
aspects of an emotion do not fall apart into two
components, but form a single unit. Following Goldie’s
([30]: 10 ff.) argument, it is possible that the intentional
content can be communicated to other people.
Peter Goldie does not deduce any stance of rational-
ity from his account of an emotion that could be used to
explain when an emotion is authentic and when it is not.
But his model opens up this possibility. An emotion is
rational if the relation between qualitative feeling and
intentional content is harmonious. In the case of an
irrational emotion, however, the relation between the
felt quality on the one hand and the intentional object on
the other hand is disharmonious.14 An emotion is
rational if there is no major discrepancy between both
its aspects. Here is an example for an irrational
emotion in the sense of a lack of rationality. In terms
of the propositional content of an emotion, a man is
convinced that a little dog sitting before him is
definitely not dangerous (Nussbaum 2001): 35.
Nonetheless, he experiences strong feelings of fear.
In this case, there is a discrepancy between the
qualitative aspect of his emotion (intense fear) and
its intentional content (his cognitive-rational convic-
tion that the object is not dangerous). The emotion is
not only arational as most emotions are, but utterly
irrational.
Occasionally, taking drugs can result in such a gap
between both aspects of an emotion, but this cannot
hold as a rule. Vice versa, there may well be a
discrepancy that is not caused by the consumption of
drugs.15
12 In a slightly different vein, in his notion of the ‘paradigm
scenario,’ De Sousa [12] captures the idea of the rationality of
emotions. Paradigm scenarios ‘are drawn first from a daily life
as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art, and
culture to which we are exposed. Later still, they are
supplemented and refined by literature and other art forms
capable of expanding the range of one’s imagination of ways to
live. Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: first, a situation
type providing the characteristic objects of the specific
emotion-type (where objects can be of the various sorts
mentioned above), and second, a set of characteristic or
“normal” responses to the situation, where normality is
determined by a complex and controversial mix of biological
and cultural factors.[ ...].’ [29] This idea implies that we regard
a person’s emotions as rational if we can trace back the
paradigm scenario from which they stem.
13 Cf. Freedman ([31], 135 ff.).
14 Cf. Salmela ([16], 205 ff.).
15 Cf. D’Arms and Jacobson [32] for an analysis of recalcitrant
emotions.
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The rationality of emotions is a sociocultural
category, implying an idea of rationality that is
embedded in the respective culture.16 ‘Sociocultural’
means the way a certain emotion is interpreted by a
group of persons or by society at large that imple-
ments certain standards of rationality. In this vein, a
person’s emotional authenticity cannot be assessed
exhaustively by self-reference because, to some
extent, everybody is socialized into a cultural context
and embedded in it, time and again being confronted
with the opinions of others who implicitly or
explicitly assess his or her emotional life.
The third standard that sometimes is applied to
emotions deals with the coherence and consistency of
an individual’s history of emotion over the course of
time.17 An abrupt change in an individual’s emotional
life will make a new emotion appear as doubtful. If
individuals have been gentle and compassionate all
their lives, people around them will have good reason
to doubt the authenticity of their emotions if they
suddenly behave in a ruthless, overbearing, and
aggressive manner.18
One could perceive a jolt, a discontinuity between
their new and old emotions. Some narrative theories
of emotion take account of these phenomena of
discontinuity. For instance, Robert C. Solomon
([33]: 24 ff.) points out that the reader recognizes
when a story is not told well in terms of the coherence
of a fictitious character’s emotional life, and chides
the author’s lack of psychological finesse. The same
seems to hold for real life.
Whereas the first standard applied to emotions
(authenticity as a phenomenally felt quality) can usually
only be applied by the individual that experiences a
certain emotional state, the other two stances, rationality
and coherence, can additionally be applied from the
first- and the third-person perspective.
It is difficult to see which of the standards
(authenticity, rationality, and coherence) is the most
important one and how they hang together. What is
important to note, however, is that the standard of
authenticity seems to be independent of the one of
rationality and of coherence. A person can experience
authentic feelings in the qualitative sense even if his
or her feelings appear as irrational and incoherent. In
contrast, the application of the rationality and the
coherence standard can in certain cases have reper-
cussions on the ascription of emotional authenticity.
For instance, it could be that individuals begin to
experience their emotions as inauthentic once they
apply the standards of rationality and coherence to
them. The standards of rationality and coherence,
once mapped to a person’s own emotions, can lead
him or her to reconsider his or her seemingly
authentic emotions, and finally even to perceive them
as inauthentic. Once individuals recognize their own
new emotions as irrational and incoherent with
respect to their other emotions, they eventually begin
to distance themselves from their own emotions and
to feel alienated from them, rather than experiencing
them as authentic anymore. From the perspective of
others, it could be that the alleged irrationality and
incoherence of a person’s emotions eventually leads
to doubts about their authenticity. However, this
connection between the three standards is certainly
not always extant.
To sum this up: According to the main argument of
this paper, each and every emotion is regarded as
authentic as long as it is perceived as such, no matter
whether it accords with the standards of rationality
and coherence or not. As far as all three standards are
concerned, it is essential to see that the biological
function of the human body is not a subject of
discourse. Authenticity is not a biological category
but a phenomenological one. Similarly, rationality and
coherence are not biological, but epistemological and
socio-cultural standards. Their application to emo-
tions works without referring to an allegedly ‘natural’
or ‘unnatural’ bodily state and the way it is brought
about or manipulated, be it by artificial means or not.
16 Salmela [16], 225 ff. also emphasizes the importance of
cultural norms when employing the example of Huckleberry
Finn.
17 For an other accounts of criteria of emotional authenticity,
see Salmela [16] about subjective perception, rationality, and
coherence. For Salmela, ‘coherence’ is the coherence of one’s
emotions ‘with one’s rational values and beliefs,’ i.e. the
coherence between ‘first- and second-order emotions and
evaluative judgments’ ([16], 210, 222). His term ‘coherence’
thus comes close to what in this paper constitutes the standard
of rationality. Further, Salmela mentions a state of an emotion
being ‘psychologically real’ (224), but it seems that for him this
is not a criterion of authenticity in its own right. His account
neither goes back to the artificiality and naturalness of an
emotion, nor to the enhancement debate. The same holds for
Salmela’s analysis of emotional truth [17].
18 This holds at least if changes cannot be traced to, for
instance, a (traumatic) event etc. If there are reasons for change,
we accept quite sudden, holistic transformations.
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This is why emotional authenticity, along with
emotional rationality and coherence, is regarded here
as a non-naturalist notion.
Some Critical Remarks
Having said this, it turns out that emotions under
Prozac sometimes fail to meet the three standards. Let
us first have a look at the standards of rationality and
coherence.
Carl Elliott [2]: 74 tells the story of a Japanese
clerk. She used to be a shy person who under Prozac
loses her social anxieties. But she also loses all
inhibitions and the due respect to be paid to her boss
and co-workers. Eventually, she decides to serve
cocktails at a dinner party for her company wearing
only a negligee. Prozac has made her lose her
anxieties to an unreasonable extent. As long as the
clerk experiences her own emotions as authentic,
there is no reason to negate their authenticity.
However, her new behavior and her new emotions
no longer fit her own lifelong rational conviction that
it would be better to pay due respect to the members
of her company—a conviction also shared by her
social environment. If we take the rationalist standard
to be valid, this is a clear case of emotional
irrationality and also of incoherence, although not of
inauthenticity.
It is difficult to normatively assess this case as well
as similar cases. On the one hand, from a prudential
point of view, one would hope on the clerk’s own
behalf that she stops taking Prozac, because it
changes her emotions and her attitude in a way that
endangers her professional career and appalls others.
On the other hand, for instance from a therapist’s
point of view or from the perspective of a friend or a
socio-critique, one could welcome the idea that she
has started to break free from societal constraints and
to lead a more authentic life in which she fearlessly
lives out her own feelings and does not care so much
about the opinion of others anymore. Maybe her new
emotional capacities provide her with a fresh per-
spective on her work life which she might have
experienced as alienating even before she had taken
Prozac.
Seen from another point of view, people on Prozac
can also have the ‘wrong feelings’ understood in an
epistemic way. As Peter Kramer ([9]; cf. [2]: 74 ff.;
[34]: 29) puts it, quoting from his interviews with
patients:
People on Prozac sometimes say that they no
longer experience grief, anxiety, or sadness
quite so deeply. Occasionally they will realize
that circumstances call for sadness—that they
are expected to share in another person’s grief,
or that they should worry about their financial
problems—but they are unable to call up the
appropriate emotional reactions. [...] It can be
‘hard to worry about anything’ while taking
Prozac ‘because nothing matters.’ (p. 258)
In this sense, the emotions of these people under
Prozac are still authentic, but not rational anymore.
Seen from a common-sense, normative point of view,
the intake of the drug can lead to a situation in which
a person loses the connection to his or her social
environment and in which his or her financial
situation becomes precarious.
However, there are not only examples in which
Prozac leads to irrational and incoherent feelings, but
also some in which it can even lead to inauthenticity,
i.e. in which the emotions a person undergoes no
longer meet the standard of authenticity as a phe-
nomenally felt quality. An example is Kramer’s
patient Philip. Paradoxically, taking Prozac is painful
for him. He considers that feeling well means to be in
a state of self-deception and inauthenticity. While on
Prozac, Philip is at first glance ‘happy.’ On the other
hand, as a second-order feeling, he realizes that there
is something wrong with his happiness. He feels it to
be inappropriate in light of his personal history as a
troubled youth. Peter Kramer [9] points out:
His moodiness and irritability were comfortable
to him, because they represented his legitimate
suffering and rage. [...] On Prozac, Philip felt
better than well, and he hated it. He had been
prematurely robbed of his disdain, his hatred,
his alienation. [...] The six months of feeling
fine were hell for Philip. He felt phony; he did
not trust himself. (p. 291)
Here, enhancement is accompanied by inauthen-
ticity in the very sense described in this paper. Philip
experiences his own emotions as inauthentic. Inter-
estingly, one could also reconstruct his feeling of
alienation from his own emotions under Prozac as his
recognition of the fact that they lack rationality and
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coherence. By running around with a smile on his
face, Philip feels inauthentic, because his actual
happiness does not correspond with the true state of
affairs, that is, his deep inner embitterment and
melancholy. As Kramer [9]: 258 puts it: ‘He was
truly relieved to stop the medicine and resume his
bitterness.’ At least from Philip’s own perspective, he
perceives his own positive feelings as inauthentic
because he experiences them as irrational and
incoherent with his emotional history.19 Here, the
standards of authenticity, rationality, and coherence
seem to merge, at least from a first-person perspec-
tive. However, the normative question is again a
tricky one. Maybe an outsider would assess Philip’s
newly gained happiness as a preferable state of mind,
even if he or she realizes that Philip feels inauthentic,
and would regard his perceived lack of rationality and
coherence as not especially worrisome. This shows
that all three standards and their normative conse-
quences are open to interpretation and depend on the
values of those who apply them.
On an even more general level, one could object that
the standard of coherence can not properly be applied to
emotions. Why should it for instance be regarded as
problematic if a person altered his or her emotional life?
At least a person’s emotional attitudes could be changed
to the positive, and there is a plethora of literature on
personal conversions and their positive moral impact. A
possible answer to the question of why one could still
regard a lack of coherence as objectionable is twofold.
First, it has been a philosophical commonplace since
John Locke and throughout biomedical ethics that
threats to diachronic personal identity are usually
regarded as problematic. The reasons for this have
partly to do with traditional religious concerns that the
integrity of a person’s soul could be endangered, and in
a moremundane way that a person’s autonomy could be
put at risk when personal identity is at stake—
autonomy being a widely accepted ethical notion.20
The discussion of this goes beyond the scope of this
paper. Second, and more importantly here, it seems
that emotions are what they are, i.e. are individualized
and defined as what they are, because they are
embedded in a nexus of other emotions. Each emotion
is embedded in the nexus of emotional attitudes a
person has developed during his or her lifetime in the
sense of an emotion interacting with other emotions
and depending on them. For example, a person who
under the influence of an enhancement drug loses the
ability to feel fear might lose other emotional abilities
as well, such as to emotionally experience importance
and moral salience. This alone does certainly not
amount to any evidence for the claim that disconti-
nuities in a person’s life are always normatively
problematic. However, it hints to the possibility that
enhancement drugs that alter people’s emotions can
lead to unexpected and uncontrollable changes in their
personalities which, in turn, might have the described
normative implications for their identity and autonomy.
At the end of this paper, I will come back to this point
when discussing happiness and sadness as emotions
that gain their meaning from being embedded into a
person’s diachronic emotional life.
Obviously, the new enhancement of emotions has
to be assessed critically, because it bears severe risks
and dangers. In the face of the current expansion of
the enhancement market, we need instruments to
assess their normative implications or even ethical
intricacies. This is why the above-mentioned non-
naturalist standards of authenticity, rationality, and
coherence could enable us to decide which acts of
enhancing emotions are normatively doubtful. I
therefore think that authors like the ‘transhumanist’
Nick Bostrom who uncritically support the enhance-
ment of emotions via technological means neglect the
complexity of our emotional life and of its inherent
normativity. He simply aims at creating ‘healthier,
happier, wittier people,’ as he puts it.21 In his paper
‘Human Genetic Enhancements: A Transhumanist
Perspective,’ where he explores the ‘posthuman
realm‘ of enhanced human beings, Bostrom states:
The range of thoughts, feelings, experiences,
and activities that are accessible to human
organisms presumably constitute only a tiny
part of what is possible. [...] It is not far-fetched
19 Very much in the line of the main thesis of this paper,
Kramer does not present Philip’s doubts as feelings of
‘unnaturalness.’
21 Cf. Bostrom [35]: 498. For a more nuanced, but still
problematic account, see Bostrom [43] in Medical Enhance-
ment and Posthumanity, eds. Bert Gordijn and Ruth Chadwick
(Springer, 2008): pp. 107-137. For a critical stance, see Healy
[36] and Klerman ([37], cit. in Kramer [9]: 277).
20 Kramer [9]: 265 however, states: ‘My impression is that
Prozac [...] generally increases autonomy.’
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to suppose that there are parts of this larger
space that represent extremely valuable ways of
living, feeling, and thinking. We can conceive
of aesthetic and contemplative pleasures whose
blissfulness vastly exceeds what any human
being has ever experienced. [...] We can imagine
love that is stronger, purer, and more secure than
any human being has yet harbored. (p. 495)
Bostrom’s underlying account of how our emo-
tional life is structured and how it could be ‘im-
proved,’ however, seems to be an oversimplifying
one. Bostrom suggests that emotional sensitivity and
the range of positive emotions should just be
increased and amplified via technical means like
emotion intensifying drugs, brain implants, and
genetic interventions.
Against Bostrom’s technological optimism, there
are, however, some severe ethical and moral concerns
to be raised as our emotional life becomes increas-
ingly subject to technological feasibility. Changing
our emotional life means changing our cultural and
epistemic norms and our standards of rationality. The
systematic use of psychopharmacological enhance-
ment in a society does not change individual emotions
of individual persons only, but always has a deeper
impact on society and even ‘human nature’ as such.
Especially emotional enhancement has consequences
on our rational and moral judgments. Following
Martha Nussbaum [28]: 19 ff. and others, emotions
play a significant role in ‘judgments of value and
importance.’ For instance, Carl Elliott ([2]: 49, cf.
Kramer [9]: 269 f.) points out that in American
culture, the adequate time of mourning over the death
of a loved one is not supposed to exceed 1 year. If
depression continues beyond this period, the mourn-
ing person is advised to see a doctor and get
medication, which in some cases might put pressure
on him or her to finish their mourning ‘prematurely.’
In contrast, in more rural societies like Greece, it is
still considered ‘normal’ to mourn for 5 years or more
—which in turn can, of course, put pressure on those
who don’t feel sad for such a long time. There is
certainly no absolutely appropriate time to mourn.
Rather, the standards seem to be culturally relative.
What is important here, however, is that Bostrom
seems to overlook how deep enhancement strategies
can alter our human self-understanding and our
perception of values. The mere existence of effective
antidepressants can alter the status and the dignity of
existential human experiences such as the capacity to
mourn extensively for a dead person and to feel
compassion for those in mourning.
This refers equally to the standards of rationality: If
our cultural standards and judgments about what is a
‘rational’ period of mourning shift because means are
available to drastically shorten it, our very standards of
appropriateness between feeling and object may change
as well. Not only in the epistemic, but also in the
normative realm, major changes are to be expected with
reference to the applied standards of appropriateness
and authenticity of emotions themselves.
Furthermore, sometimes our emotions expose
considerable intelligence and rationality, and therefore
should not be changed. Think only of the Japanese
clerk: Prozac made her lose her anxieties to an
unreasonable extent, and from a rational perspective,
it would have been better for her to pay due respect to
her colleagues ([2]: 74).
Last but not least, emotions obey laws of their own
and form a coherent nexus. This idea refers to the
third standard, the one of coherence. Most emotions
are not ‘enhanceable’ in the same way cognitive
features are. You can quantitatively enhance your
memory performance and your IQ score. But enhanc-
ing well-being and happiness will run up against
internal limits, due to the internal logic and nexus of
emotions.22 To illustrate this, here are a few remarks
on the capacity of antidepressants to increase happi-
ness. For instance, if a psychotropic drug increases
happiness more and more, there may be a point at
which happiness becomes too intense and suddenly
turns into mere silliness. Furthermore, happiness is a
contrast term. Only those who also know what
sadness is can be happy in the true sense of the word.
Happiness alone cannot be stretched over time
without becoming shallow and stale. It loses its
meaning if it does not have a counterpart. Due to
the extensive use of antidepressants, one day we may
become unable to feel sadness and deep melancholy
any more. And this, in turn, means that we run the
risk of forgetting the internal meaning of happiness
22 Salmela [16], 218 also points out that Ronald de Sousa and
Bennett Helm ([12], 324, [38]) deal with the interconnections
of emotions with each other. Helm emphasizes that emotions
‘impose rational commitments on each other.’ As indicated
before, Salmela’s notion of coherence seems to be reserved for
the coherence of emotions and beliefs.
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itself, which has its place in a complex nexus of other
emotions. All future enhancement methods will have
to carefully explore the complexities of emotions to
avoid destroying their subtle authentic balance.
Conclusions
It transpired that in certain respects one could call Prozac
an authenticity-generating drug. The perfectionist work-
ing mother Julia in Peter Kramer’s case study feels more
authentic than ever after having taken Prozac. So does
the overly shy patient Tess who allegedly finds her true
or ideal self thanks to the drug. There is no reason to
doubt the achieved emotional authenticity of these and
other patients who claim to have reached similar results.
The overwhelming majority of patients described by
Kramer feel authentic, the standard of felt phenomenal
quality being fulfilled. Having ‘authentic’ emotions
eventually helps them to experience full self-realization.
Therefore, in contrast to authors like David Pugmire
and to bio-conservative authors in the enhancement
debate, a person may well have authentic emotions or
emotions of authenticity, even when they are induced
artificially. The seemingly necessary causal link be-
tween artificial origin on the one hand and resulting
emotional inauthenticity on the other does not prove
valid. There are artificially induced authentic emotion-
al states. And vice versa, there are naturally engen-
dered emotions that turn out to be inauthentic.
What this paper has attempted to show is that
emotional authenticity or inauthenticity cannot be
inferred from the naturalness or artificiality of the
devices employed. This is why the standard of the
authenticity of emotions was declared a non-naturalist
standard. The same holds for the assessment of
emotional rationality and coherence. It is certainly true
that, as the example of the patient Philip has shown,
some patients may lose their emotional authenticity
while on medication and others no longer meet the
standards of emotional rationality and coherence.
Nevertheless, this loss of emotional authenticity, emo-
tional rationality, and coherence, again, has to be
assessed by epistemic and sociocultural categories, not
by biological ones. The most important insight of this
article was therefore that the authenticity of an emotion
seems to be independent of its natural or artificial origin.
On the other hand, the uncritical and unlimited
enhancement of emotions via technological means as
suggested by, for example, ‘transhumanist’ authors falls
short of recognizing the complexity and subtlety of our
emotional life. Obviously, the enhancement of emotions
is a more sophisticated enterprise than the enhancement
of cognitive performance, of athletic skills, or physical
beauty. Our emotions depend on each other in a fragile
nexus that can easily be destroyed by uncontrolled
manipulation. It remains far from clear whether the
simple enhancement of positive emotions such as
‘happiness’ or of emotional sensitivity and empathy
would lead to a good and authentic life. In order to reject
an uncritical technological optimism, we therefore need
reliable intrinsic stances of emotional authenticity,
rationality, and coherence to assess future strategies
of the enhancement of emotions. Such a consideration,
however, should leave simplistic bio-conservative
ideas of the naturalness of emotions behind.
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